FINAL PAPERS: Forces and Issues in the Middle East
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posted by DR. AZLY RAHMAN at
2:45 PM
Tuesday, November 15, 2005
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- On Hannah Arendt's "On Totalitarianism"
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- 34] The Threat of Osama bin Laden and American Res...
- Terrorism, War, Global Responsibility
- 33] Modern Islamic Radicalism
- 32] Early Ideologues of Islamic Radicalism
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The attacks of 9/11/2001 shattered the long standing indifference of the Western world toward the cultures of the Middle East by prompting scholars and policy makers to explain the root causes of Islam’s antipathy toward the West. At the same time Islamic scholars such as B. Edward W. Said and the publications like The Middle East and Islamic World Reader strove to undue the popular misconception of Islam as a monolithic ideology by giving greater emphasis to the long standing political and theological differences that influenced the growth and expansion of distinct philosophies within Islam. Of these the most prominent, and by far the least understood within the Western world, are the divisions between the Sunni, Shiite, and the Kharaji Islamic sects and their continuous failure to reconcile their differences and unite under the auspices of the Islamic faith. Complicated by the universally adhered to Islamic belief that sovereign power can be exercised only through “...struggle with Holy War against those who have been invited to join Islam and rejected it...” and the aftermath of 9/11, these factors continue to question whether the currently existing divisions within Islam could ever be reconciled? (23) Although many notable scholars have attempted to answer this question, their unwillingness to give more than a passing notice to the beginnings of the political-theological divisions within Islam have frequently nullified the effectiveness of their work. (345)
Established upon the teachings of Prophet Muhammad in 7th century A.D., this new faith focused on the creation of the perfect society dubbed “umma,” which would be devoid of want and torment and endowed with the peaceful bliss that would emerge once humanity reached a state of complete submission to God. (21) According to the Quran, Islam’s holy text, this ideal society began with the emergence of the Islamic faith and was to continue after the death of prophet Muhammad, the very first Caliph, under the leadership of a new and highly capable “Caliph” who would maintain the spiritual purity of the umma by insuring the clarity of all of the interpretations of the Quran that will be made by the respective Imam of the disparate Islamic communities. While the Quran goes on to further elaborate the role of the Caliph, it abstains from suggesting how aspiring umma should select their Caliphs and thus gives rise to the very divisions that continue to be manifest within the Islamic world.
The currently predominant Sunni faction continues to believe that the role of the Caliph ought to be reserved to direct blood descendants of the prophet Muhammad despite the fact that the text of the Quran explicitly indicates that Prophet Muhammad selected as his successor not one of his sons but a son in law Ali ibn Abi Talib whom the prophet Muhammad deemed to be the most able to take up the post after his passing. (25) According to the 11th century Islamic philosopher Abd al-Hasan Ali al-Mawardi, those members of umma eligible to select an imam must base their selection on candidate’s ability to protect the purity of the faith, administer justice, protect the integrity of Muslim lands against non-believers. Although Sunni scholars have never disputed the need for the most able person to assume the weighty responsibilities of Caliph, they have always maintained that the Caliph ought to be chosen from Muhammad’s hereditary clan of Quraysh.(23)
This view is disputed by the followers of Shiite Islam, who believe that Prophet Muhammad’s selection of Ali ibn Abi Talib clearly demonstrates that he was the best qualified and most virtuous member of the umma and reserves the imamate for his descendants.(24) Simultaneously, the Shiite appear to agree with their Sunni counterparts on the scope and type of spiritual and earthly qualifications needed to vest the imam with his authority. Unlike their Sunni counterparts, the Shiites believe that the power and authority vested in the imam stem directly from God who selects the best imam for every umma. This Shiite interpretation of Islam is at least partly founded on the belief that spiritual enlightenment must be part of the daily lives of all umma.
An entirely different interpretation of Islam can be found in doctrines followed by the Kharajite sect. Unlike their Sunni and Shiite counterparts, the Kharajites believed that imams should be chosen by the umma regardless of lineage. While the Kharajites agreed with their Sunni and Shiite counterparts on the scope and type of qualities desirable within an imam, they differed with both Sunnis and Shiites by adhering to a view that the community had the right to depose their imam if he should somehow fail to meet the needs of his umma. (22) Although the Kharajites once formed a significant part of Islam and helped in the creation of several Islamic dynasties, successive military defeats at the hands of their Islamic rivals and outside colonizers, along with popular disenchantment with Kharajite’s stringent interpretation of the Quran, vastly diminished their political and cultural influence within Islam. Simultaneously, the refusal of either the Sunni or the Shiite sects to fully encompass the Kharajites by modifying their own interpretations of the Quran helped to deepen the philosophical and cultural divisions within Islam. Over time these divisions resulted in ever greater periods of warfare that continuously undermined aspiring dynasties while expanding the political and economic effects of such fragmentation to the whole of the Middle East.
Recognizing the detrimental nature of this effect on the future of the greater Islamic civilization, the influential 19th century Islamic philosopher Jamal al-Din al-Afghani called on Islamic scholars to reconcile these differences to ensure Islam’s ability to survive the increasing might of the industrializing Christian countries of Western Europe. Preaching strength through unity, al-Afghani called for a re-interpretation of the Koran and emphasized the differences between political and clerical needs of Islamic states. Stressing the continuing deterioration of Islamic scientific and cultural traditions within the Islamic world, al-Afgani called upon Islamic rulers to forgo their corrupt ways and instead give greater emphasis to the resurrection of global Islamic scientific and technological dominance.
Understanding the potential of Western technological advances to marginalize Islamic powers, El Afgani urged Middle Eastern princes to divest themselves of ecclesiastic duties and give greater attention to the construction of a powerful and lasting state by noting “...that every leader would do his outmost to preserve the others, since his own life and survival depends on them.” (99) At its core El Afgani’s message re-affirmed the 14th century notion of social solidarity first proposed by ibn Khaldun while simultaneously repudiating ibn Khaldun’s philosophical construct of dynastic succession.
Devoid of sectarian overtones, ibn Khahdun ‘s philosophies postulated a notion of governance through the exercise of social solidarity which he defined as the compulsion of others to willingly follow and obey their leader. (54) According to Ibn Khaldun social solidarity may be based on direct blood ties that serve as the basis of the family unit or on the looser sense of kinship which is re-enforced in his mind by fear of dishonor stemming from failure of one to fulfill his obligations as in the case of patron-client relationships. No matter its ultimate form, the end purpose of such social solidarity was the creation of sovereignty that societies bestowed upon leaders capable of galvanizing popular support to create lasting dynasties. Consequently, Ibn Khaldun espoused the view that to be effective dynastic rulers had to transform their social solidarity into long term political stability by realizing that “...a state is founded upon solidarity..”(56) Such stability would, after several generations, enable the dynasty to be free from the need to continuously cultivate popular support for its leadership.
According to ibn Khaldun, once this transition occurs the polity transforms into a state with vast array of powers which would be vested in a single ruler who must be capable to decimate any and all challengers either in the scope of his own life or over the course of succeeding generations. Recognizing that the power of ego and the prospect of vengeance upon one’s challengers may be too tantalizing to ignore, ibn Khaldun urges all rulers to remember that their titles and positions are relative to their relationship with the very people over whom they claim to rule and the need of those populaces of a wise and just ruler. Wisdom and justice, encapsulated by ibn Khaldun in the term “goodness”, are thus deemed to be the basis for effective government that seeks to better the lives of the governed while avoiding over emphasis of their shortcomings. Failure to do so would sow descent within the populace, undermine the basis of social solidarity and encourage the people to abandon the state in times of war. Conversely, ibn Khaldun predicted that states with good rulers will succumb to external aggression after only three generations since the quiet peace that would follow the start of the dynasty’s second generation would serve to diminish many of the combative behavioral traits that permitted the dynasty and its followers to rise to power. Seemingly harsh, this portion of ibn Khaldun’s teachings drove the efforts of Arab nationalists like Jamal al-Afgani who fervently believed that Islamic states could resurrect their past glory and thwart European aggression only with concerted efforts at alliance building, military buildups, industrial economic development, and a greater willingness of Islamic states to accept and utilize Western science and technology.
Although al-Afgani’s efforts ultimately proved fruitless, his work did foster the growth of pan-Islamic and Arab nationalist ideologies that helped to blur Western perception of Islam to a point where even such influential scholars as B. Edward W. Said find it difficult to challenge the monolithic portrayal of Islam by scholars such as A. Bernard Lewis. (345)
To a great extent the difficulty arises from the incontrovertible nature of contemporary Middle Eastern history in which Western concepts and ideals are openly scorned for failing to meet the mounting expectations of increasingly impoverished Islamic states. Openly stated by A. Bernard Lewis, such statements drew only emotional, never factual, criticism from Islamic scholars who, like B. Edward W. Said view these very facts as little more than renewed Western ideological assaults on the already weakened Islamic world. Thus A.B. Lewis’ analysis of the contemporary observation of the growth of Islamic radicalism and Arab nationalism can be answered by B.E.W. Said only with endless re-iterations of already well known examples of the past accomplishments of the once aspiring Islamic states who exist today as little more than mere shadows of their past selves. And while A.B. Lewis is not afraid to acknowledge the bloody and frequently ignominious events that, in the Western world led to the evolution of secularism, personal freedoms, and market capitalism that are the basis of contemporary Western dominance, B.E.W. Said appears to shy away from objective critical analysis of the failed Islamic states of the middle East in favor of factually irrelevant jibes at his better armed ideological rivals.
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